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Abstract
Background: Payment for performance (P4P) strategies, which provide financial incentives to health workers and/or
facilities for reaching pre-defined performance targets, can improve healthcare utilisation and quality. P4P may also
reduce inequalities in healthcare use and access by enhancing universal access to care, for example, through
reducing the financial barriers to accessing care. However, P4P may also enhance inequalities in healthcare if
providers cherry-pick the easier-to-reach patients to meet their performance targets. In this study, we examine the
heterogeneity of P4P effects on service utilisation across population subgroups and its implications for inequalities
in Tanzania.
Methods: We used household data from an evaluation of a P4P programme in Tanzania. We surveyed about 3000
households with women who delivered in the last 12 months prior to the interview from seven intervention and
four comparison districts in January 2012 and a similar number of households in 13 months later. The household
data were used to generate the population subgroups and to measure the incentivised service utilisation
outcomes. We focused on two outcomes that improved significantly under the P4P, i.e. institutional delivery rate
and the uptake of antimalarials for pregnant women. We used a difference-in-differences linear regression model to
estimate the effect of P4P on utilisation outcomes across the different population subgroups.
Results: P4P led to a significant increase in the rate of institutional deliveries among women in poorest and in
middle wealth status households, but not among women in least poor households. However, the differential effect
was marginally greater among women in the middle wealth households compared to women in the least poor
households (p = 0.094). The effect of P4P on institutional deliveries was also significantly higher among women in
rural districts compared to women in urban districts (p = 0.028 for differential effect), and among uninsured women
than insured women (p = 0.001 for differential effect). The effect of P4P on the uptake of antimalarials was equally
distributed across population subgroups.
Conclusion: P4P can enhance equitable healthcare access and use especially when the demand-side barriers to
access care such as user fees associated with drug purchase due to stock-outs have been reduced.
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Introduction
Payment for performance (P4P) is a supply-side finan-
cing strategy which involves financial incentives being
paid to health workers and/or facilities for reaching pre-
defined performance targets. This approach started in
high-income countries (HICs) with the aim of improving
health care quality [24, 64, 65]. P4P is also increasingly
being used in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) to improve quality and use of health services,
as well as to strengthen health systems [31, 57, 89]. The
evidence base on the effectiveness of P4P is growing and
suggests mixed effects with notable improvements for
some incentivised indicators [9, 11, 17, 24, 26, 35, 61, 69,
73, 77].
However, most evaluations focus on average effects
and pay little attention to distributional effects across
provider or population subgroups [51]. There is, how-
ever, a growing awareness that average effects may mask
important heterogeneous programme effects [12, 13, 19,
22, 38, 41, 51]. This study examines the heterogeneity of
P4P effects on service utilisation across population sub-
groups. The overall goal is to display heterogeneous
treatment effects, and specifically to check if the effects
on population subgroups will reduce or enhance exiting
inequalities in access to and utilisation of health care
services.
Inequalities in access to and use of health services in
favour of wealthier populations are still prevalent in
many settings, with the greatest inequalities in the poor-
est settings [8, 15, 52, 56, 60, 68, 78, 79, 82, 84]. Factors
referred to as “social determinants of health” such as
economic status, education, location and age [21, 54, 60,
87], mostly drive these inequalities. From a theoretical
point of view, it is hard to know how P4P will affect pre-
existing inequalities. However, P4P can reduce inequal-
ities in access to healthcare, for example, by encouraging
providers to extend services to underserved groups (e.g.
by reducing financial barriers to access care) in a bid to
meet performance targets [31, 57]. On the other hand,
P4P could also enhance inequalities in access to health-
care if providers cherry-pick the easier-to-reach patients
in order to meet their performance targets [40].
Studies in HICs have found differential effects of P4P
on healthcare quality between socioeconomic groups in
favour of wealthier populations (pro-rich) but this effect
declined over time. These studies have not found any
differential effect with respect to age, sex and ethnicity
[2, 14, 24, 80]. Evidence from LMICs is more limited
and varied across service types [63]. For example, the ef-
fect of P4P on institutional delivery rates was greater
among wealthier groups (pro-rich) in most settings [17,
46, 77] but there was an indication that it was greater
among poorer groups (pro-poor) in Tanzania[11]. The
effect of P4P on institutional deliveries was greater
among women with health insurance in Rwanda [46] or
a maternity care voucher in Cambodia [77] than their
counterparts. The effect of P4P on family planning
coverage was greater among wealthier groups (pro-rich),
in Rwanda [46], and the effect on immunisation cover-
age was greater among poorer groups (pro-poor), in
Burundi [17]. However, studies based on Rwanda
Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data reported no
differential effect by socioeconomic groups on the
use of maternal care [62] and on child curative care
seeking [72].
To date, most studies on differential effects of P4P
have disaggregated the effect of P4P across population
economic status particularly in LMICs, with little atten-
tion to other social determinants (e.g. education, occu-
pation, and age), which are also known to affect the use
of health services [4, 60], including maternal health ser-
vices [30, 32, 71]. The assessment of programme differ-
ential effects across various social determinants in a
broad perspective is crucial to inform universal access
policies [28, 53, 60], and may help to understand how
different service users are affected by a programme such
as P4P [63]. In this paper, we examine the differential ef-
fect of P4P on service utilisation in Tanzania across a
variety of population subgroups by stratified analyses ac-
cording to various social determinants.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section pre-
sents the conceptual framework, followed by the de-
scription of the P4P programme in Tanzania. The other
sections include the methods and analysis, followed by
the results, discussion and conclusion.
Conceptual framework
P4P programmes give providers incentives to change
their behaviour to improve the quality of care in order
to enhance utilisation and obtain financial rewards [66].
Based on this logic P4P can improve average service util-
isation and the distribution of improved utilisation
across population subgroups through the supply-side re-
sponse (how providers respond to incentives) and the
resulting demand-side response that triggers (how pa-
tients respond to supply side changes).
Supply-side response
To meet performance targets aimed at increasing the
quantity of services provided, providers are likely to
adopt strategies to attract more patients to facilities [31,
57]. One such strategy could be to make services more
affordable [57], for example by reducing user fees, or by
reducing drug stock-outs, avoiding patients having to
procure drugs privately [10, 11]. Another strategy could
be to improve responsiveness to service users, for ex-
ample, by being kinder during service delivery [11].
However, providers might also attempt to cherry-pick
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patients or focus on easy-to-reach populations (i.e.
underserved but easily reached) in order to meet the
performance targets [25, 40], leaving the hard-to-reach
(i.e. poorest with greatest need) underserved. In fact,
providers may need to exert greater effort and time to
serve the hard-to-reach [37]. The efficiency gains in that
case can be reached but at the expenses of inequity [47].
Demand-side responses
According to Andersen’s behavioural model of health-
care utilisation [3, 4], the use of health services is a func-
tion of patient’s propensity to use services (predisposing
factors), factors that facilitate or impede access and use
(enabling factors), as well as perceived need for health-
care (need factors). These factors among others are also
social determinants of health [21, 54, 74]. The interac-
tions between a P4P programme (supply-side response)
and social determinants (demand-side factors) may
affect the use and distribution of health services. For ex-
ample, reduced financial barriers to access care, resulting
from provider response to incentives, may stimulate de-
mand especially for poor and/or uninsured individuals,
since they are more responsive to a change in healthcare
costs consistent with demand theory [33, 49]. Demand
for health services may also increase if the quality of care
supplied is improved [1]; for example, through increased
drug availability and better interpersonal care [10, 11].
Better-off populations (e.g. wealthier, educated, and
urban residents) may also benefit more from quality im-
provements simply because they use services more than
their counterpart populations [8, 15, 21, 32, 54, 68, 81].
Despite the potential interactions between the demand
and supply-side response to P4P, the health care sector
does not operate like a classic free market [6, 61]. For
example, the demand-side response may be weak when
some demand-side barriers to access care (e.g. cultural
and information barriers) are unaffected by the supply-
side response to incentives [27, 48, 61, 88].
P4P in Tanzania
In 2011, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare
(MoHSW) in Tanzania with support from the Govern-
ment of Norway introduced a P4P scheme as a pilot in
Pwani region. The scheme aimed to improve maternal
and child health (MCH) and inform the national P4P
roll out. Pwani is one of 30 regions in the country and
has seven districts with more than 209 health facilities.
It has a population of just over a million [59]. All health
facilities providing MCH services in the region were eli-
gible to implement the P4P scheme. The P4P scheme in-
volved a series of performance targets for facilities that
were set in relation to the coverage of specific services
(e.g. institutional delivery) or for care provided during a
service (e.g. uptake of antimalarials during antenatal
care) (Table 1), as described in more detail elsewhere
[11, 18]. Performance was rewarded based on two
methods of target setting: single and multiple thresholds
targets. The strategies to reach performance targets were
left to the discretion of the health workers at the individ-
ual facilities. District and regional managers were also
eligible to receive performance payouts based on the
performance of the facilities in their district or region.
The extent to which facilities were successful in
achieving performance targets determined the level of
bonus payout they would receive as part of the
programme. Full payment was made if 100% of a given
target was achieved, and 50% of payment was made for
75% < 100% achievement, while no payment was made
for lower levels of performance. The maximum payout if
all targets were fully attained was USD 820 per cycle for
dispensaries; USD 3220 for health centres and USD
6790 for hospitals. The payouts were additional to the
funding facilities receive to cover operational costs and
salaries of health workers. Incentive payouts at the
facility-level included bonuses to staff (equivalent to 10%
of their monthly salary if all targets were fully attained)
and funds that could be used for facility improvement or
demand creation initiatives (10% of the total in hospitals
and 25% in lower level facilities). District and regional
managers received bonus payments of up to USD 3000
per cycle.
To determine whether performance targets were met,
performance data were compiled by facilities and verified
by the P4P implementing agency every six months (one
cycle) before distributing payouts.
The P4P programme was the subject of a process and
impact evaluation. The impact evaluation showed a sig-
nificant positive effect on two out of eight incentivised
service indicators: institutional delivery rate and
provision of antimalarial during antenatal care [11]. P4P
was also associated with a number of process changes
such as increased availability of drugs and supplies, in-
creased supportive supervision, a reduced chance of pay-
ing user fees, and greater provider kindness during
delivery care [5, 10, 11, 55].
Methods
Study design
Our study used data from a controlled before and after
evaluation study of the P4P scheme in Pwani region,
Tanzania, described elsewhere [11, 18]. All seven dis-
tricts in Pwani region (intervention arm), and four dis-
tricts from Morogoro and Lindi regions (comparison
arm) were sampled. The comparison districts were se-
lected to be comparable to intervention districts in
terms of poverty and literacy rates, the rate of institu-
tional deliveries, infant mortality, population per health
facility, and the number of children under one year of
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age per capita [18]. Baseline data collection was done in
January 2012, with a follow-up survey 13 months later.
Sampling and data source
In the intervention arm, we included all 6 hospitals and
16 health centres that were eligible for the P4P scheme,
and a random sample of 53 eligible dispensaries. A simi-
lar number of facilities were included in the comparison
arm. Facilities were randomly sampled amongst those
where P4P was implemented and matching comparison
facilities were selected based on facility level of care,
ownership, staffing levels, and case load [18]. To assess
maternal and child health service utilisation in the popu-
lation, we randomly sampled 20 households of women
from the catchment area of each health facility who had
delivered in the 12 months prior to the survey. In total,
we surveyed 3000 households with eligible women in
both arms at baseline, and a similar number in the
follow-up survey. The household survey also collected
information on maternal background characteristics (e.g.
age, marital status, education occupation, religion, and
number of births), and household characteristics (e.g.
household size, health insurance status, and ownership
of assets and housing particulars for assessing the house-
hold socioeconomic status).
Outcome variables
Our outcome variables include the two incentivised ser-
vices which we know from prior analysis improved
significantly as a result of P4P: institutional deliveries
and uptake of two doses of intermittent preventive treat-
ment (IPT2) for malaria during antenatal care [11].
These were measured as binary outcomes for whether a
woman gave birth in a health facility and received IPT2
during antenatal care, respectively.
Generation of subgroups for distributional analyses
To examine the distribution of P4P effects on these two
outcomes, we generated population subgroups based on
individual and household-level characteristics, accord-
ing to Andersen’s behavioural model of healthcare utilisa-
tion [3, 4]. In this study we only considered predisposing
and enabling factors since data on perceived illness was
not available. “Perceived illness” could also be argued to
be of less relevance for maternal service utilisation
outcomes, since study participants were largely healthy.
Subgroups of predisposing factors include: marital sta-
tus (married vs. none), maternal age (15–49) years
(below vs. above the median age of 25), education (no
education vs. primary level/above), occupation (farmer
vs. non-farmer), religion (Muslim vs. non-Muslim),
number of births/parity (parity 1 vs. parity 2/above), and
household size (below vs. above the median size of 5
members). Subgroups of enabling factors include: health
insurance status (any insurance vs. none), place of resi-
dence (rural vs. urban district), and household wealth
status subgroups. The wealth subgroups were generated
from wealth scores derived by the principal component
Table 1 Service indicators and performance targets for facilities implementing P4P in Tanzania
P4P service indicators Method Baseline coverage (previous cycle)
0–
20%
21–
40%
41–
70%
71 − 85% 85%+
Coverage indicators
% of institutional deliveries Percentage point
increase
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain 85%+
% of mothers attending a facility within 7 days of delivery. Percentage point
increase
15% 10% 5% 5% Maintain 85%+
% of women using long term contraceptives Percentage point
increase
20% 15% 10% Maintain above
71%
Maintain 85%+
% children under 1 year received measles vaccine Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain 85%+
% children under 1 year received Penta 3 Overall result 50% 65% 75% 80%+ Maintain 85%+
% of complete partographs Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%+ Maintain above
80%
HMIS reports submitted to district managers on time and
complete
Overall result 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Content of care indicators
% ANC clients receiving two doses of IPT Overall result 80% 80% 80% 80%+ Maintain above
80%
% HIV+ ANC clients on ART Overall result 40% 60% 75% 75%+ Maintain 85%+
% of children receiving polio vaccine (OPV0) at birth Overall result 60% 75% 80% 80%+ Maintain 85%+
The United Republic of Tanzania, Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. 2011. The Coast Region Pay for Performance (P4P) Pilot: Design Document
85% + = 85% or more; 80% + = 80% or more; HMIS Health Management Information System, ANC Antenatal care
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analysis based on 42 items of household characteristics
and asset ownership (Appendix 1: Table 5) [29, 83]. The
household wealth scores were generated separately for
baseline and follow-up samples, since participants dif-
fered over time. Households were ranked by wealth
scores from poorest (low score) to least poor and classi-
fied into three-equal sized groups (terciles): poorest,
middle and least poor. Subgrouping based on five-equal
sized groups (quintiles) were also generated to examine
the sensitivity of the findings to different wealth
subgroupings.
Statistical analysis
We first compared the sample means of individual and
household-level characteristics at baseline between inter-
vention and comparison arms, and assessed whether the
differences between arms were statistically significant by
using t-tests. We then assessed the distribution of ser-
vice utilisation outcomes at baseline across population
subgroups by estimating the utilisation gap (i.e. a differ-
ence in average service use between two subgroups)
[87]. We used t-tests to test whether the utilisation gaps
were significantly different from zero.
To examine whether the effects of P4P on outcomes
differed across population subgroups, we first performed
subgroup analyses to identify the P4P effect on each sub-
group, and then tested the significance of differential ef-
fects between subgroups through analysing the
interaction effect. We identified the average effect of
P4P on service utilisation by using a linear difference-in-
differences regression model. This model compares the
changes in outcomes over time between participants in
the intervention and comparison arms as specified in
Eq. (1):
Y ijt ¼ β0 þ β1 P4P j  δt
 þ β2δt þ β3Xijt þ γ i
þ εijt ð1Þ
where Yijt is the utilisation outcome (institutional deliv-
eries or uptake of IPT2) of individual i in facility j’s
catchment area and at time t. The intervention dummy
variable P4Pj takes the value 1 if a facility is in the inter-
vention arm and 0 if it is in the comparison arm. The
unobserved time invariant facility characteristics γj were
controlled for through facility fixed-effects estimation;
and included δt for year fixed effects. We also controlled
for individual and household-level covariates Xijt (age,
education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, in-
surance status, household size, and household wealth
status) as potential confounders. The error term is εijt.
We clustered the standard errors at the facility level, or
facility catchment area, to account for serial correlation
of εijt at the facility level. The effect of P4P on utilisation
for each subgroup is given by β1.
To test the significance of an eventual differential ef-
fect across subgroups, we included a three-way inter-
action term between the average treatment effect
(P4Pj × δt) and a subgrouping variable Gi (based on pre-
disposing and enabling factors). The associated two-
order interaction terms were also included in the model.
The coefficient of interest is β4 which indicates the dif-
ferential effect of P4P across subgroups as shown in Eq.
(2):
Y ijt ¼ β0 þ β1 P4P j  δt
 þ β2δt þ β3Xijt
þ β4 P4P j  δt  Gijt
 
þ β5 P4P j  Gijt
 þ β6 Gijt  δt
 þ γ j
þ εijt ð2Þ
The use of the difference-in-difference approach to es-
timate the effect of P4P on outcomes relies on the key
identifying assumption that the trends in outcomes
would be parallel across study arms in the absence of
the intervention [41]. While this can never be formally
tested, we supported the assumption by verifying that
the pre-intervention trends in utilisation outcomes at
the household level were parallel across study arms as
described elsewhere [11]. By surveying women who had
delivered in the past 12 months at baseline, four longitu-
dinal outcomes were generated and used to verify the as-
sumption: share of institutional deliveries, caesarean
section deliveries, women who breastfeed within one
hour of birth, and women who paid for delivery care.
We further performed several robustness checks. First,
we re-estimated the P4P differential effect by using
wealth quintiles instead of wealth terciles to examine
whether the results were sensitivity to wealth group clas-
sification. We also generated wealth status subgroups for
each study arm and re-estimated the P4P differential ef-
fect by arm-based wealth subgroups to avoid the pre-
existing baseline imbalance in wealth status between
arms. Second, we re-estimated the regression model by
including three-way interactions with categorical vari-
able which gives multiple subgroups (e.g. education
levels, occupation categories, parity groups and age
groups) instead of interactions with binary variables (e.g.
married vs. none). Third, we applied a non-linear logit
model instead of linear model because of binary out-
come variables. Fourth, we clustered the standard errors
at the district level instead of facility level and used a
bootstrapping method to adjust for the small number of
clusters [20]. All the analyses were performed by using
STATA version 13.
Results
The majority of individual and household characteristics
were similar across intervention and comparison arms at
baseline (Table 2). Exceptions were women in the
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intervention arm, who were more likely to be married,
non-farmers, and Muslim; and their households were
more likely to be poor than their counterparts in the
comparison arm.
The baseline rates of institutional deliveries in
both arms were significantly lower for women in the
poorest and middle wealth households, and for
women who were illiterate, farmers, with parity
greater than one than for their counterpart women
(Table 3). The rate of institutional deliveries was also
higher among intervention women with health insur-
ance and from smaller households, as well as among
urban women in the comparison arm than among
their counterparts. The baseline uptake of IPT2 was
generally similar across arms and population sub-
groups, except married women in the comparison
arm, who were more likely to receive IPT2 than un-
married women (Table 3).
P4P significantly increased the rate of institutional
deliveries among women in the poorest and in the
middle wealth status households, but not among
women in the least poor households (Table 4). How-
ever, when compared with the least poor subgroup,
the effect of P4P was only marginally greater among
women in the middle wealth status households only
(p = 0.094 for differential effect) (Table 4). The effect
of P4P on institutional deliveries was also significantly
higher among women in rural districts compared to
women in urban districts (p = 0.028 for differential ef-
fect), and among uninsured than insured women (p =
0.001 for differential effect). There were no differen-
tial effects of P4P on institutional deliveries among
other subgroups, and no differential effects of P4P on
the IPT2 outcome across any population subgroups
(Table 4).
Our results were generally consistent following ro-
bustness checks. When we used wealth quintiles in-
stead of terciles, the effect of P4P on deliveries was
significantly higher in lower quintiles (indication of
pro-poor) compared to the effect in the top quintile
(least poor), but the results on IPT2 remained the
same (Appendix 2: Table 6). When we used the arm-
based wealth subgroups, the differential effect by
quintiles on both outcomes remained broadly un-
changed, but the differential effect by terciles on de-
liveries disappeared and appeared marginally for IPT2
(Appendix 2: Table 6). The effect of P4P on both out-
comes remained equally distributed across categorical
Table 2 Baseline individual woman and household characteristics by study arms
Characteristics Description/subgroup Intervention arm (n =
1376)
Comparison arm (n =
1468)
Difference
Panel A: Predisposing factors
Marital status =1 for married woman (%) 69.9 64.2 5.7b
Age Mean maternal age (15–49) years [SD] 26.5 [6.7] 26.3 [6.5] 0.2
Age =1 for younger below median age (25 years) (%) 50.9 50.5 0.4
Education =1 for primary education/above (%) 80.3 80.2 0.1
Occupation =1 for farming activities (%) 46.0 54.5 –8.5b
Religion =1 for Muslim woman (%) 86.5 66.6 19.9a
Parity Mean number of births [SD] 2.7 [1.8] 2.6 [1.7] 0.1
Parity =1 for one birth (%) 32.4 31.6 0.8
Household size Mean number of household members [SD] 4.7 [1.8] 4.8 [1.8] −0.1
Household size =1 for small/below the median size of 5 members
(%)
51.1 50.5 0.6
Panel B: Enabling factors
Health insurance status =1 for insured woman (%) 8.6 8.5 0.1
Household wealth
status
Mean household wealth index [SD] −0.43 [2.7] 0.34 [3.3] −0.77b
Wealth status –tercile 1 =1 for poorest household (%) 38.3 29.4 8.9b
Wealth status –tercile 2 =1 for middle wealth household (%) 33.6 33.3 0.3
Wealth status –tercile 3 =1 for least poor household (%) 28.1 37.3 −9.2b
Place of residence =1 for rural district (%) 79.3 84.1 −4.8
SD=Standard Deviation; Subgroups of predisposing factors include: marital status (married vs. none), maternal age (15–49) years (below vs. above the median age
of 25), education (no education vs. primary level/above), occupation (farmer vs. non-farmer), religion (Muslim vs. non-Muslim), number of births/parity (parity 1 vs.
parity 2/above), and household size (below vs. above the median size of 5 members); Subgroups of enabling factors include: health insurance status (any insur-
ance vs. none), place of residence (rural vs. urban district), and household wealth status subgroups (wealth terciles); adenotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat
10% level
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subgroups of education, occupation, parity and age
(Appendix 3: Table 7). Some changes in the results
were noted with the use of a logit model, the pro-
middle wealth and pro-rural effect on deliveries disap-
peared but all other results including the pro-
uninsured effect remained the same (Appendix 4:
Table 8). When standard errors were clustered at the
district-level instead of at facility-level, the differential
effect on deliveries by health insurance and wealth
status disappeared, and women from larger house-
holds increased institutional deliveries more than
their counterparts, but all other results including
the pro-rural effect remained unchanged (Appendix
5: Table 9).
Discussion
This study examined the distribution of P4P effects on
service utilisation outcomes across population subgroups
in Tanzania. This is the first study in LMICs to examine
who is really benefiting from the effects of P4P across a
broad range of population characteristics which aligns
with the social determinants of health framework. We
found that P4P increased institutional deliveries more
among women in middle wealth status households,
among the uninsured, and among women living in rural
areas than among wealthier, insured, and urban residing
women. However, these differential effects were sensitive
to the analytical specifications used during the robust-
ness checks. The effect of P4P on IPT2 was equally
Table 3 Baseline levels of service utilisation by subgroups across study arms
Outcome variable/ subgrouping variable Intervention arm Comparison arm
Yes No Gap Yes No Gap
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OUTCOME 1: Institutional deliveries (n = 1376) (n = 1468)
Predisposing factors
Married woman (%) 84.8 84.7 0.1 86.7 87.0 −0.3
Woman below median age of 25 years/younger (%) 85.4 84.2 1.2 87.3 86.4 0.9
Woman with primary education/above (%) 85.9 80.4 5.5b 89.8 74.8 15.0a
Woman doing farming for occupation (%) 79.1 89.6 −10.5a 82.6 91.9 −9.3a
Muslim woman (%) 84.7 85.4 −0.7 87.5 85.5 2.0
Woman with one birth/parity 1 (%) 90.1 82.3 7.8a 92.5 84.3 8.2a
Household size below the median size of 5 members (%) 87.2 82.3 4.9b 87.3 86.4 0.9
Enabling factors
Woman with any health insurance (%) 89.9 84.3 5.6c 83.3 87.1 −3.8
Household with poorest wealth status (Tercile 1) (%) 83.3 91.7 −8.4a 80.5 94.2 −13.7a
Household with middle wealth status (Tercile 2) (%) 80.8 91.7 −10.9a 84.2 94.2 −10.0a
Household in rural district (%) 83.9 88.0 −4.1 85.8 92.3 −6.5c
OUTCOME 2: Uptake of IPT2 (n = 1029) (n = 1.199)
Predisposing factors
Married woman (%) 51.0 47.0 4.0 59.3 51.7 7.6b
Woman below median age of 25 years/younger (%) 48.7 51.1 −2.4 55.5 57.6 −2.1
Woman with primary education/above (%) 50.9 45.1 5.8 57.5 52.9 4.6
Woman doing farming for occupation (%) 48.5 51.1 −2.6 56.3 56.9 −0.6
Muslim woman (%) 49.9 50.4 −0.5 58.2 53.5 4.7
Woman with one birth/parity 1 (%) 48.0 50.8 −2.8 57.9 56.1 1.8
Household size below the median size of 5 members (%) 50.7 49.1 1.6 55.3 57.9 −2.6
Enabling factors
Woman with any health insurance (%) 45.6 50.4 −4.8 61.6 56.1 5.5
Household with poorest wealth status (Tercile 1) (%) 47.8 49.6 −1.8 59.7 54.2 5.5
Household with middle wealth status (Tercile 2) (%) 52.6 49.6 3.0 56.9 54.2 2.7
Household in rural district (%) 50.4 48.1 2.3 56.7 56.4 0.3
We used a t-test to test the null hypothesis of a gap (column 3 and 6) equals to zero; Tercile 3 (least poor) was the reference category for Tercile 1 and 2; adenotes
significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat 10% level
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distributed across population subgroups, and was robust
across various analytical specifications. Our results show
a declining trend in inequality to access institutional de-
liveries since service use improved most for subgroups
which initially showed low utilisation rates; while the ab-
sence of inequality in uptake of IPT2 at baseline main-
tained after the introduction of P4P.
The greater impact of P4P on the use of institutional
deliveries among women in the middle wealth
households and uninsured than wealthier and insured
respectively, is likely in part due to the increased adher-
ence to user fee exemption policy among public facilities
as well as the improved availability of drugs, minimising
the need to pay for drugs in private pharmacies [5, 10,
11, 27, 39, 43, 45, 85, 86, 90]. The worse-off groups
which experienced a greater P4P effect were also more
responsive to a change in healthcare costs [33, 49]. This
is consistent with our conceptual framework and
Table 4 Effect of P4P on service utilisation outcomes by population subgroups
Subgrouping variables Institutional deliveries Uptake of IPT2
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
N Beta N Beta
Marital status
Married 3869 7.7a (p = 0.564) 3253 10.2a (p = 0.927)
Unmarried 1878 9.1b 1504 9.1
Maternal age
Younger below the median age 2914 8.5a (p = 0.553) 2336 9.6b (p = 0.841)
Older above the median age 2833 7.2b 2421 9.8b
Education
Some education 4611 8.9a (p = 0.378) 3877 9.3a (p = 0.780)
No education/illiterate 1136 5.9 880 16.5c
Occupation
Farmer 2950 11.5a (p = 0.133) 2434 16.0a (p = 0.167)
Non-farmer 2797 5.6b 2323 5.6
Religion
Muslim 4376 9.7a (p = 0.435) 3623 10.5a (p = 0.562)
Non-Muslim 1371 3.9 1134 6.0
Parity/births
One birth 1886 9.7a (p = 0.517) 1510 9.3c (p = 0.882)
Two or more births 3861 7.6a 3247 10.3a
Household size by members
Small size (< 5) 2996 5.1c (p = 0.173) 2476 7.7c (p = 0.964)
Large size (≥5) 2751 10.4a 2281 9.9b
Health insurance
Insured 475 −7.6 (p = 0.001) 429 20.1c (p = 0.932)
Uninsured 5272 9.7a 4328 10.4a
Household wealth subgroups
Tercile 1 (poorest) 1940 11.4b (p = 0.232) 1559 14.5b (p = 0.158)
Tercile 2 (middle) 1916 10.2a (p = 0.094) 1576 16.2a (p = 0.149)
Tercile 3 (least poor) 1891 3.7 Reference 1622 2.6 Reference
Place of residence
Rural district 4694 9.9a (p = 0.028) 3851 11.4a (p = 0.349)
Urban district 1053 0.9 906 3.3
Beta is the estimated P4P effect on a specific subgroup in percentage point after controlling for a year dummy, facility-fixed effects, and individual and
household-level covariates (age, education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, health insurance status, household size, and household wealth status); Each
cell for Beta and differential effect reports the result from a separate regression; Differential effect test is a t-test of the null that the coefficient on the three-way
interaction between the P4P effect and subgrouping indicator is zero; adenotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat 10% level
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demand theory, whereby the supply-side responses of re-
ducing the financial barriers to access delivery care in
turn stimulated the demand-side responses on service
utilisation mostly among the disadvantaged population.
The finding that the increased uptake of IPT2 was
similar across population subgroups may be ex-
plained by the already almost universal access to one
antenatal care visit in Tanzania (above 97%) [11, 75,
76]. In an effort to achieve the IPT2 target, pro-
viders likely encouraged women to return for subse-
quent antenatal care visits to receive at least two
doses of IPT. This represents a relatively easy task
for most providers because continuation of care
needs less effort than its initiation [34]. Although
the provision of IPT is within the control of pro-
viders, it also depends on the available stock of anti-
malarial drugs for IPT. Another reason for the lack
of differential effect on IPT2 may have been the pre-
existing balance in the uptake of IPT2 across popu-
lation subgroups at baseline. This is the first study
to examine whether P4P had a differential effect on
the uptake of IPT for malaria during antenatal care
in LMICs. In Burundi, Bonfrer et al. [17] examined
the differential effect of P4P on other contents of
antenatal care and found a pro-rich effect on blood
pressure measurement and a lack of differential ef-
fect on the uptake of anti-tetanus vaccination across
socioeconomic groups.
The pro-middle wealth effect of P4P on institutional
deliveries, as an indication of being pro-poor, is con-
trary to the pro-rich effect on deliveries reported in
Burundi [17], Rwanda [46] and Cambodia [77]. The
pro-rich effect in Cambodia was attributed to the lack
of effective demand among the poorest women due to
user fees [77]; whereas in Burundi it was attributed to
other costs like transport because the user fees for
deliveries were removed prior to P4P [17]. However, a
pilot study in Burundi [16] and a study using demo-
graphic and health survey (DHS) data in Rwanda [62]
found no differential effect on deliveries by household
wealth status; and the results in the later study were
attributed to low and uniform coverage of services at
baseline. In the Democratic Republic of Congo pro-
viders implementing P4P negotiated user fees with
communities and raised revenues without hurting the
poorest [73], but the equity effects of this approach
were not assessed empirically. Further evidence of a
pro-poor effect of P4P has been shown on immunisa-
tion services in Burundi [17], and on quality of care
improvement in high-income countries especially in
the United Kingdom [2, 14, 23, 24, 80].
Moreover, our study found that institutional deliveries
improved more in rural than in urban areas, while there
was no differential effect on institutional deliveries by
place of residence in Rwanda [62]. In Rwanda, the
minimal number of urban clusters compared to
rural clusters were thought to limit the power to
detect the differential effect by place of residence
[62], while our study had a slightly higher number
of urban clusters compared to Rwanda (i.e. 28 ver-
sus 22 urban clusters). In the United Kingdom, the
effect of P4P on quality of care was greater in urban
areas than in rural areas [36, 42], while there was
no differential effect of P4P on quality of care by
rural–urban area in the United States [67].
We found a greater P4P effect on institutional de-
liveries among uninsured women, whereas a greater
effect on deliveries was found among women with
health insurance in Rwanda [46] and a maternity care
voucher in Cambodia [77]. The findings from Rwanda
and Cambodia were attributed to reduced financial
barriers to access care [46, 77], and this could be the
case with a stronger enforcement of fee exemptions
in Tanzania [11].
However, another study in Rwanda based on DHS, as
nationally representative data, found no differential ef-
fect on deliveries by health insurance status [62]. A
greater P4P effect on deliveries among uninsured
women in Tanzania, is partly because the baseline insti-
tutional delivery rate was already higher among insured
than uninsured women in the intervention arm. A fur-
ther reason could be that uninsured women were more
responsive to reduced healthcare costs compared to in-
sured women who were already covered. It is also likely
that the statistical power to detect the effect among
women with insurance was limited because few women
are insured in Tanzania [58], compared to other coun-
tries like Rwanda [50, 70].
Furthermore, we found a similar distribution of insti-
tutional delivery rates and IPT2 uptakes across age
groups prior to P4P, and the effect of P4P was equally
distributed across age groups, which is contrary to P4P
studies in high-income countries as they found inequal-
ities in quality of care across age groups existed and per-
sisted after the introduction of P4P [2, 14, 24, 80].
Overall our findings imply that when P4P results in
supply side responses that reduce demand-side bar-
riers to accessing care, it can enhance equity in ser-
vice utilisation. P4P also appears less likely to show a
differential effect when there is a similar level of ser-
vice utilisation in a given indicator across population
subgroups prior to an intervention. This study sup-
ports the argument that P4P can enhance equity in
access for services where there is a pre-existing in-
equity in coverage, and where efforts to remove the
demand-side financial barriers to access care have
been made [28, 31, 44, 57, 86]. Thus, to ensure P4P
reduces inequities in access to care, policy makers
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should consider introducing complementary measures
to reduce demand-side access barriers. P4P is likely
to be most effective at reducing inequities in settings
where they offer free health services or there is high
coverage of pre-payment schemes.
To make progress towards universal health cover-
age and achieve sustainable development goal three
especially in LMICs, more efforts are needed to
stimulate demand for and supply of healthcare ser-
vices [57, 86, 90]. Further insights on how supply
and demand side interventions interact and comple-
ment each other to affect outcomes are needed.
Moreover, because the social determinants of health
as sources of inequalities emerge from different sec-
tors, strategies within the health sector alone cannot
reduce inequalities in access and use of health ser-
vices [21, 54].
This study has a number of limitations. First, our
study may have been underpowered to detect the ef-
fect of P4P in some groups, for example among in-
sured women and urban residents, possibly due to
the more limited sample size within sub groups. Sec-
ond, our results of differential effects on deliveries by
wealth status, health insurance and place of residence,
were not consistent across all analytical specifications
used in robustness checks (i.e. non-linear model, and
district level clustering of standard errors). However,
the differential effects on deliveries for other sub-
groups of social determinants, and differential effects
on IPT2, were robust to all analytical specifications
used. Third, our finding that P4P reduces inequalities
in service utilisation might be reflective of a regres-
sion to the mean principle (a random fluctuation ra-
ther than a true causal effect) because of having a
short term evaluation [7]. Lastly, we restricted our
distributional analysis to the outcomes which im-
proved significantly under P4P. Although the inequal-
ities in service use may happen with an outcome
which showed insignificant P4P effect on average, our
focus was limited to how the increased average util-
isation effects were distributed across population
subgroups.
Conclusion
In Tanzania, the effect of P4P on institutional deliver-
ies was greater among women in middle wealth
households, in rural areas and among the uninsured
women than their counterparts. P4P effect on the up-
take of IPT2 was equally distributed across population
subgroups. Our finding suggests that P4P can en-
hance equitable healthcare access and use especially
when the financial barriers to access care are reduced
or removed.
Appendix
Appendix 1
Table 5 Items used to construct household wealth status score
No. Variable description
1. Asset: electricity
2. Asset: working radio
3. Asset: working television (TV)
4. Asset: working DVD
5. Asset: working mobile phone
6. Asset: working landline phone
7. Asset: working iron
8. Asset: working refrigerator
9. Asset: working wall watch
10. Asset: sewing machine
11. Asset: table
12. Asset: sofa coach
13. Asset: cupboard
14. Asset: motorcycle
15. Asset: car
16. Household member with a bank account
17. Number of sleeping rooms
18. Source of drinking water: piped water
19. Source of drinking water: borehole/ covered well
20. Source of drinking water: open well
21. Source of drinking water: spring water
22. Source of drinking water: river/ dam/pond/lake
23. Toilet type: flush toilet
24. Toilet type: pit latrine
25. Toilet type: no/ other toilet
26. Source of cooking energy: electricity
27. Source of cooking energy: kerosene/paraffin
28. Source of cooking energy: charcoal
29. Source of cooking energy: firewood
30. Source of light: electricity
31. Source of light: solar
32. Source of light: kerosene/ paraffin
33. Source of light: candle/ firewood
34. Source of light: torch or other source
35. Floor material: sand/earth/dung
36. Floor material: cement
37. Floor material: other
38. Wall material: grass/poles/mud wall
39. Wall material: bamboo with mud wall
40. Wall material: sundried/ burnt bricks
41. Wall material: cement blocks
42. Wall material: stones with mud
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Appendix 2
Table 6 Effect of P4P on service utilisation by different categories of wealth status and by arm-based wealth subgroups
Wealth subgrouping variables Institutional deliveries Uptake of IPT2
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
N Beta N Beta
Panel A: Wealth subgroups
Three wealth subgroups (Terciles)
T1 1940 11.4b (p = 0.232) 1559 14.5b (p = 0.158)
T2 1916 10.2a (p = 0.094)c 1576 16.2a (p = 0.149)
T3 1891 3.7 Reference 1622 2.6 Reference
Five wealth subgroups (Quintiles)
Q1 1170 13.8b (p = 0.079)c 929 13.6c (p = 0.166)
Q2 1158 8.8c (p = 0.069)c 939 16.3b (p = 0.102)
Q3 1143 8.2c (p = 0.034)b 938 21.8a (p = 0.120)
Q4 1146 11.4a (p = 0.015)b 979 14.4b (p = 0.175)
Q5 1130 −0.5 Reference 972 1.9 Reference
Panel B: Arm-based wealth subgroups
Three wealth subgroups (Terciles)
AT1 1917 10.2b (p = 0.293) 1540 13.8b (p = 0.117)
AT2 1913 9.2b (p = 0.156) 1568 18.3a (p = 0.084)c
AT3 1917 3.9c Reference 1649 2.5 Reference
Five wealth subgroups (Quintiles)
AQ1 1149 15.3a (p = 0.089)c 914 16.8b (p = 0.108)
AQ2 1151 6.6 (p = 0.230) 935 15.2b (p = 0.139)
AQ3 1147 12.3b (p = 0.001)a 949 14.6b (p = 0.156)
AQ4 1152 9.9b (p = 0.022)b 972 7.7 (p = 0.310)
AQ5 1148 0.3 Reference 987 0.5 Reference
adenotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat 10% level; Beta is the estimated P4P effect on a specific subgroup in percentage point after controlling for a year
dummy, facility-fixed effects, and individual and household-level covariates (age, education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, health insurance status,
household size, and household wealth status); Each cell for Beta and differential effect reports the result from a separate regression; Differential effect test is a
t-test of the null that the coefficient on the three-way interaction between the P4P effect and subgrouping indicator is zero
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Appendix 3
Table 7 Effect of P4P on service utilisation by subgroups for categorical variables
Subgrouping variables Institutional deliveries Uptake of IPT2
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)N Beta N Beta
Education subgroups
No education 1136 5.9 Reference 880 17.0b Reference
Some primary 459 4.1 (p = 0.550) 355 9.1 (p = 0.479)
Primary/some secondary 3729 11.3a (p = 0.157) 3148 12.1a (p = 0.965)
Secondary/above 423 3.8 (p = 0.276) 374 −9.8 (p = 0.144)
Occupation subgroups
Formal sector 113 −17.4 (p = 0.715) 99 −5.1 (p = 0.329)
Farmers 2950 11.6a (p = 0.162) 2434 15.9a (p = 0.777)
Self-employed 1167 7.7b (p = 0.650) 996 1.1 (p = 0.132)
Unemployed 1517 3.9 Reference 1228 16.8a Reference
Birth parity subgroups
Parity 1 1886 9.8a Reference 1510 9.3c Reference
Parity 2 1353 3.4 (p = 0.215) 1123 7.0 (p = 0.583)
Parity 3 1029 10.9b (p = 0.766) 868 0.4 (p = 0.317)
Parity 4 664 3.3 (p = 0.342) 570 3.2 (p = 0.567)
Parity 5+ 815 13.3c (p = 0.700) 686 30.0a (p = 0.038)
Age subgroups
Age (15–19) years 965 11.5a Reference 726 19.2b Reference
Age (20–24) years 1613 9.7a (p = 0.366) 1322 4.2 (p = 0.708)
Age (25–29) years 1459 4.2 (p = 0.568) 1232 7.3 (p = 0.820)
Age (30–34) years 978 4.9 (p = 0.510) 846 10.3 (p = 0.666)
Age (35+) years 732 15.5a (p = 0.446) 631 20.4b (p = 0.218)
adenotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and cat 10% level; Beta is the estimated P4P effect on a specific subgroup in percentage point after controlling for a year
dummy, facility-fixed effects, and individual and household-level covariates (age, education, occupation, religion, marital status, parity, health insurance status,
household size, and household wealth status); Each cell for Beta and differential effect reports the result from a separate regression; Differential effect test is a
t-test of the null that the coefficient on the three-way interaction between the P4P effect and subgrouping indicator is zero
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Appendix4
Table 8 Effect of P4P on service utilisation by subgroups –using the non–linear logit model
Subgrouping variables Institutional deliveries Uptake of IPT2
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)
Average subgroup effect Differential
effect test
(p-value)N (dy/dx) N (dy/dx)
Marital status
Married 3385 9.2a (p = 0.503) 3253 9.2a (p = 0.935)
Unmarried 1338 13.3a 1481 9.8c
Maternal age
Younger below the median age 2361 11.2a (p = 0.492) 2336 9.2b (p = 0.830)
Older above the median age 2325 9.1a 2421 9.5b
Education
Some education 4021 10.9a (p = 0.070) 3877 8.6a (p = 0.793)
No education/illiterate 900 9.1 816 16.5c
Occupation
Farmer 2638 13.4a (p = 0.590) 2396 16.0a (p = 0.149)
Non-farmer 2126 7.5b 2295 5.3
Religion
Muslim 3991 10.8a (p = 0.497) 3614 9.7a (p = 0.554)
Non-Muslim 980 5.6 1061 7.8
Parity/births
One birth 1180 15.2a (p = 0.122) 1476 9.9c (p = 0.939)
Two or more births 3436 9.3a 3247 10.0a
Household size by members
Small size (< 5) 2381 7.3b (p = 0.320) 2464 7.6c (p = 0.903)
Large size (≥5) 2299 12.8a 2281 9.1b
Health insurance
Insured 171 −20.7 (p = 0.012) 315 18.3 (p = 0.900)
Uninsured 4820 11.1a 4328 10.1a
Household wealth status
Tercile 1 (poorest) 1656 13.4b (p = 0.894) 1508 13.2b (p = 0.145)
Tercile 2 (middle) 1528 12.7a (p = 0.737) 1539 17.1a (p = 0.106)
Tercile 3 (least poor) 1066 8.2b Reference 1599 2.4 Reference
Place of residence
Rural district 4387 11.3a (p = 0.152) 3851 11.2a (p = 0.268)
Urban district 787 1.6 906 1.7
Non-linear logit model with FE, covariates, clustering at HF level; Logit with FE cuts down the sample size; dy/dx is the estimated partial P4P effect on a specific
subgroup in terms of marginal effect after controlling for a year dummy, facility-fixed effects, and individual and household-level covariates (age, education, occu-
pation, religion, marital status, parity, health insurance status, household size, and household wealth status); Each cell for dy/dx and differential effect reports the
result from a separate regression; Differential effect test is a t-test of the null that the coefficient on the three-way interaction between the P4P effect and sub-
grouping indicator is zero; a denotes significance at 1%, bat 5%, and c at 10% level
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effect test
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Younger below the median age 2914 8.5 (p = 0.565) 2336 9.6b (p = 0.790)
Older above the median age 2833 7.2b 2421 9.8
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Some education 4611 8.9c (p = 0.400) 3877 9.3a (p = 0.800)
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Uninsured 5272 9.7b 4328 10.4a
Household wealth status
Tercile 1 (poorest) 1940 11.4 (p = 0.400) 1559 14.5a (p = 0.120)
Tercile 2 (middle) 1916 10.2c (p = 0.125) 1576 16.2a (p = 0.050)
Tercile 3 (least poor) 1891 3.7 Reference 1622 2.6 Reference
Place of residence
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Urban district 1053 0.9 906 3.3
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